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Abstract
During the Second Iraq War (Operation Iraqi Freedom),
high-intensity, low-utilization medical and surgical services,
such as neurosurgical care, were consolidated into a central-
ized location within the combat zone. This arrangement
necessitated intra-theater air medical evacuation of critically
ill or injured patients from outlying combat support hospitals
(CSH) to another combat zone facility having the needed
services. A case series is presented of intratheater transfer of
neurosurgical patients in Iraq during 2005-06. Ninety-eight
patients are included in the series, with typical transfer dis-
tances of 40 miles (approximately 20–25 minutes of flight
time). All patients were transported with a CSH nurse in
addition to the standard Army EMT-B flight medic. Seventy-
six percent of cases were battle injury, 17% were non-battle
injuries, and the balance were classified as non-injury mecha-
nisms. Seventy-six percent of cases were head injuries, with
the balance involving burns, stroke, and other injuries. At 30
days, 12% of the patients had died, and 9% remained hospi-
talized in a critical care setting. None of the patients died dur-
ing evacuation. Intratheater and interfacility transfer of
critical care patients in the combat theater often involves
severely head-injured and other neurosurgical cases. Current
Army staffing for helicopter transport in these case requires a
nurse or other advanced personnel to supplement the stan-
dard EMT-B flight medic.
Introduction
Helicopter transport was first used in World War II, and the
first large-scale evacuation of wounded soldiers by helicopter
took place during the Korean War.1 During the Vietnam War,
the modern concept of air medical evacuation was first used
on a large scale, and through these wartime experiences mod-
ern civilian air emergency medical services was born.
The military prefers the term evacuation, whereas the civil-
ian community uses transport, but the concepts are inter-
changeable. The Army medical evacuation system comprises
both ground and air evacuation platforms. The UH-60 Black
Hawk helicopter is the dedicated airframe for Army evacua-
tion. Other airframes such as the CH-47 Chinook were also
used, but this was infrequent. These airframes by design are
rugged and capable; however, the medical staffing and equip-
ment are limited by military doctrine.2
Wounded soldiers are treated within the limits of the
combat medic (equivalent to EMT-B) at the point of injury
or at a frontline aid station. After initial stabilization, they
are evacuated by either ground or air ambulance to a
Combat Support Hospital (CSH).3 If the distance to the
CSH is far, the patient may first be evacuated to a Forward
Surgical Team (FST) for resuscitative surgery before reach-
ing the CSH. If the injuries are severe, or a prolonged
recovery is anticipated, the patient is flown to Europe and
eventually evacuated to the United States aboard specially
equipped United States Air Force evacuation aircraft con-
figured as flying intensive care units (ICUs).4
An underlying premise of the military medical evacua-
tion system is that the level of care increases as a wounded
soldier is evacuated from the point of injury. However,
anecdotal reports from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
suggest continued challenges in achieving this goal during
the transfer phase from an outlying CSH or FST to a more
centrally located and capable CSH. Critical care patients
being transferred from outlying facilities often require
advanced-level care, and the standard medical staffing of
Army helicopters may not fully match the needs of the
patient. This case series highlights the issues of interfacil-
ity transfer in the combat zone and explores the types of
patients transported and the medical staffing involved in
the transport.
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Methods
This is a nonconcurrent analysis of consecutive cases
treated at the 10th CSH located in Baghdad and evacuated
by air medical evacuation teams to another CSH within Iraq.
The data source is case logs maintained by the transferring
CSH emergency department (ED). These logs tracked 98
critically ill or injured patients requiring emergent air med-
ical evacuation from the 10th CSH to another intratheater
medical facility in Baghdad, Iraq, from December 2005
through September 2006. Most of these patients were
acutely injured patients arriving directly from the point of
injury. They received stabilizing treatment at the 10th CSH
ED and required specialized care that was not available at
the 10th CSH. This case series does not include routine post-
operative or ICU transfers. Outcomes were determined at
approximately 30 days through follow-up information pro-
vided by institutions receiving the patients. Protocol
approval was obtained by the Institutional Review Board of
Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
Results
Ninety-eight patients were evacuated during the review
period. All patients were evacuated in one of two different
helicopter airframes: a UH-60 Black Hawk or a CH-47
Chinook helicopter. The evacuation distance by air for these
patients was 40 miles (a 20-25-minute flight time in a combat
environment).5 Flight crews varied depending on the air-
frame. At a minimum, the crew consisted of two pilots, one
flight medic (trained to the basic emergency medical techni-
cian [EMT] level), and one maintenance crew chief. Because
of the severity of injuries, a registered nurse from the 10th
CSH accompanied each evacuated patient.5
The amount of time spent at the 10th CSH from initial
arrival until transfer was available for 59 of the 98 evacuated
patients and is shown in Figure 1. Data collection for the
patient log began in December 2005; collection of the “time
spent on site” data did not begin until March 2006.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of battle and nonbattle
injuries. This distribution is important to the military for
administrative purposes and is defined explicitly.6 Tables 1
and 2 show the breakdown by specific injury or illness.
Figures 3 and 4 describe outcomes and causes of death.
Thirty-day follow-up information was available on  98% of
these patients evacuated to a higher level of care. At 30 days,
12% of the patients had died, and 9% remained hospitalized
in a critical care setting. None of these patients died during
evacuation (Figs. 3 and 4).
Discussion
Our case series suggests that emergency interfacility trans-
fer of patients was relatively common in the Iraqi theater in
2005 to 2006. Nearly 100 patients were transferred in a 10-
month period from a single site (there were typically 3 to 4
CSHs in Iraq). Local conditions, including the rate of patients
produced by the war and the geographic location of the point
of injury, can affect the incidence of transfers. In our case
series, the primary reason for transfer appears to be related to
the lack of certain types of specialty care at the 10th CSH. In
particular, the lack of neurosurgical capability was the main
reason for transfer of 88 (90%) of the patients transferred. At
the time of the study, only one CSH in Iraq had neurosur-
geons on staff and a fully-capable neurosurgical ICU.
The evacuations in this series were not scheduled; they
were urgent evacuations of critically ill or injured patients
from the ED. These patients required intensive en route
critical care to include constant monitoring of vital signs,
manual or mechanical ventilation, and maintenance of
intravenous fluids and administration of necessary intra-
venous medications for sedation and the treatment of ele-
vated intracranial pressure and seizures. Most patients
spent less than 2 hours in the ED before transfer, and thus
their clinical stability was not always assured; however, a
significant number of cases had undocumented times, lim-
iting this interpretation.
Information from other sources shows that the procedures
performed most commonly while in flight are intubation, air-
way management, and intravenous access.7 Other commonly
performed in-flight patient care interventions and procedures
include oxygen administration, spinal immobilization, splint-
ing and dressing, and cardiopulmonary resuscitation.8
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Figure 1. Time Duration From Arrival at CSH to Transfer to Next
Facility
Figure 2. Interfacility Evacuations
The First Iraq War (Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm) unmasked several medical issues in which the U.S.
military had fallen behind civilian systems of injury care.9
Among the issues highlighted was the level of medical atten-
dant accompanying wounded patients. By the mid-1990s, the
standard civilian air evacuation model included staffing by a
paramedic or a critical care nurse. The Army staffing model,
however, still relied on the Vietnam-era model of a combat
medic trained to the EMT-B level. A 1997 paper reviewed the
issue and recommended that “advanced training for flight
medics and improved lifesaving equipment be considered
standard.”10 A follow-on report in 2000 focused on a large
Army helicopter program and concluded that 35% of trauma
and 11% of nontrauma patients were transported by an EMT-
B combat medic when a higher level of care was indicated.8
The data in the current series indicate that the helicopter
medical staffing situation had not appreciably changed in the
intervening decade.
To address the perceived interfacility transfer capability
gap, a number of initiatives were proposed and initiated. In
1994, after Gulf War I, the Air Force developed mobile criti-
cal care teams called Critical Care Aeromedical Transport
teams in response to an unmet military need for long-range
air evacuation of critically ill and injured patients.11 The
teams usually consist of an intensivist physician, a critical
care nurse, and a respiratory therapist.12 This solved the “out
of the war zone” evacuation of critical patients, but did not
address the interfacility or intratheater evacuation of patients,
most of who were still transferred with a single EMT-B com-
bat medic in attendance.
On a local level, field hospitals responded by placing
nurses on the helicopters, but this degraded the already
stretched CSH staff because it could take days to repatriate
the nurses from the receiving hospital back to their assigned
hospital. Of note, the nurses in this series received no formal
flight training, and the critical care equipment had to be
loaded and unloaded off the helicopter for each mission.
In an attempt to address these gaps, the Army implemented
a new training program on en route care, the Joint Enroute
Care Course, in 2005. The approach was to train nurses and
other medical personnel at the CSH to perform the interfacil-
ity evacuations. This bridged the gap for the transported
patient but did not address the underlying issue of consum-
ing scarce CSH resources to accomplish an evacuation mis-
sion. It also did not resolve the problem for FSTs. These
far-forward surgical units are very thinly staffed and cannot
afford to loan even a single nurse without suffering significant
degradation of capability.
Remarkably, the Army recently embarked on a bold ini-
tiative to train all Army flight medics to the level of EMT-
paramedic.13 Flight medics would also be certified as
critical care flight paramedics. Once fully implemented,
this initiative will substantially bridge the interfacility
transfer care gap in the Army air medical system, because
every medical helicopter will have a crewmember capable
of managing critical care patients.
With plans in place to improve the capability of the med-
ical attendant on Army helicopters, future studies will be
needed to evaluate how this additional training has
improved the care of and outcomes for the wounded.
Additional studies also may help assess whether these
changes will bring parity in medical staffing and capability
in comparison with civilian programs.
Limitations
This is a case series reviewing evacuations conducted from
a single site during a 10-month period. This series was con-
ducted through a log review and not a complete medical
records analysis. It focused on emergent evacuations of ED
patients requiring additional interventional care. This study
did not review the thousands of “routine” evacuations that
included stabilized postoperative patients or patients already
admitted to the ICU. Additionally, this series did not include
the initial ground or air evacuation of wounded patients from
their point of injury. This analysis did not provide specific
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Table 1. Injury Categories
Battle Injuries 73
Head trauma (5 with multi trauma) 57
Spinal trauma (1 with multi trauma) 5
Other trauma (6 with associated head or spinal trauma) 10
Undocumented injuries 1
Non-Battle Injuries 17
Head trauma (one with associated infection) 10
Spinal trauma 6
Other trauma 0
Undocumented injuries 1
Nontraumatic Diagnosis Requiring Evacuation 6
Acute myocardial infarction 2
Hydrocephalus 1
Seizure 1
Stroke 1
Subarachnoid hemorrhage 1
2 patients with undocumented mechanisms of injury with "other"
trauma
Table 2. Injuries Sustained (Other than Head or Spinal)
Facial 9
Eye 2
Torso 3
Extremity 3
Burns not otherwise specified (NOS) 1
Shrapnel NOS 1
Fracture NOS 1
Multiple fractures NOS 1
Multiple injuries NOS 1
information on in-flight patient care or emergent interven-
tions that were performed while en route. It also did not ana-
lyze the details of whether the medical personnel were
specifically trained in air medical evacuation, critical care, or
whether they had attended the Joint Enroute Care Course.
Conclusion
Intratheater and interfacility transfer of critical care
patients in the combat theater often involves severely head-
injured and other neurosurgical cases. Current Army
staffing for helicopter transport in these case requires a
nurse or other advanced personnel to supplement the stan-
dard EMT-B flight medic.
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